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MARSHALL J. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES,
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED
STATES—LAW, STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS
Roberta S. Karmel+
This book is an elegant and comprehensive analysis of federal independent
regulatory agencies. My own lens on the independent agencies in the federal
system comes from my experiences as a staff member of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) from 1962–1969, and then a commissioner from
1977–1980. I was a director of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. from 1983–
1989 and then a member of the National Adjudicatory Council of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (now the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, also known as “FINRA”), so I also view securities regulation from
the perspective of a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”). The authors had
gained experiences in other sectors of the government, and so their viewpoints
are a bit different from my own. Those differences made for interesting reading
on my part, and some objections to their analysis. However, the authors and I
are all academics, and similarly interested in the history, operation, and future
of independent federal agencies.
At times this book fails to adequately distinguish between executive branch
agencies and classic independent agencies, such as the SEC. This is not
surprising because, as the authors concede in their final chapter, “[t]he
administrative process owes more to history and experience than to doctrine.”1
Very generally, the authors view the President and the Congress as engaged in a
tug of war over the independent agencies.2 This is a valid framework, except
that it has greater validity during periods when the executive and legislative
branches of government are controlled by different political parties, with
different perspectives on the utility and purposes of federal regulation. This was
not as true when I was a commissioner and President Carter and the
congressional oversight committees for the SEC were basically in agreement on
the SEC’s mission and operations. Further, viewing control of independent
agencies as a grand constitutional power struggle fails adequately to address the
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1. MARSHALL J. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED
STATES: LAW, STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS 395 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015).
2. See id. at 16.
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politicization of agencies due to partisan congressional influence and oversight.3
The authors also do not address how congressional influence results in agency
capture, which undermines an agency’s mission. The authors concede that “a
substantial body of the Republican Party is determined to reduce the role and
scope of government in the American economy . . . [and] should they succeed,
the impact on the independent agency forum will be significant.”4
Two great strengths of this book are the extensive and authoritative footnotes
(happily on each page for easy reference) and the appendices on agency
characteristics; comparisons of multi-member and other agencies;5 cases,
statutes, bills and reorganization plans;6 and an index and bibliography.7 All of
these materials make this book a useful research tool, and should be helpful to
academics and others interested in understanding federal agencies.
Chapter Two of the book traces the origins of independent agencies, using the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) as a template, as the ICC is commonly
considered the first independent federal regulatory agency.8 Other agencies
discussed are the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Power Commission,
the National Labor Relations Board, and the Federal Reserve Board.9 Each is a
multi-member agency, each is in some ways like the ICC but also different, and
as the authors note, their “creation reveals a considerable degree of pragmatic
development and evolution.”10 Although independence and non-partisanship
were both values in their creation, a greater value was expertise. In today’s
complicated, technologically advanced world, expertise is probably needed
more than ever in regulation, but populists on the right and left tend to debunk
expertise and it does not seem to be as valued as it was by those who created the
ICC and other independent agencies.
Chapter Three on “Theories of Agency Independence” sets forth the authors’
view on how efforts to centralize administrative power in a unitary executive
and congressional pushback has affected agency independence, but has not met
with any consistent Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of
independent agencies or intellectual theories on how independent agencies
3. See, e.g., id.; see also, e.g., Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Agency Design and
Distributive Politics 11 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 539,
2010). The authors in their last chapter acknowledge that “Congress, perhaps more than the
president, is now a primary influence on most independent agencies.” BREGER & EDLES, supra
note 1, at 382.
4. BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 392, 394.
5. Id. at 463–64.
6. Id. at 465–99.
7. Id. at 501–62.
8. Id. at 19–36. Actually, an agency supervising boilers on steamships, which were
frequently blowing up and killing passengers, was the first federal regulatory agency, and it was
housed in the Treasury Department. See Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 106, 10 Stat. 61.
9. BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 37–55.
10. Id. at 56.
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should be organized.11 In Chapter Four, on agency structure and appointments,
the authors discuss the few cases where the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether agency members enjoy freedom from firing by the President once
appointed by him, with the advice and consent of the Senate.12 In these chapters
and elsewhere, the authors view agency independence as a matter of
independence from the President. The authors hardly discuss agency
independence from Congress. Although the authors explain that the statutory
composition of multi-member agencies is designed to eliminate partisan
decision-making, there is little focus on whether today’s agencies are nonpartisan.
In the current highly divisive and partisan world of the Obama
Administration, nominated members of the SEC other than the Chair have been
paired as Democratic and Republican commissioners—many of whom have a
background from the congressional committees that have oversight over the
SEC.13 Neither the SEC Chair nor the President seems to enjoy the freedom to
choose non-partisan candidates who will be confirmed by the Senate.14
Qualifications are based on ideological correctness rather than expertise.15 This
has led to very contentious and partisan decision making with many 3-2
11. Id. at 59–85.
12. See id. at 87–132.
13. See Robert Schmidt & Dave Michaels, Ex-Senate Aide Said to Be Leading Candidate for
SEC Seat, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 3, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201506-03/ex-banking-panel-aide-said-to-be-leading-candidate-for-sec-seat.
14. See id. President Obama’s first choice of a Democratic commissioner to replace
Commissioner Aguilar was torpedoed by Senator Elizabeth Warren because he came from a private
law firm. E.g., David Dayen, Obama Names Lisa Fairfax to SEC, a Vote for Wall Street Reform,
THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 20, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/10/20/obama-names-lisafairfax-to-sec-a-vote-for-wall-street-reform/. Many stellar previous SEC commissioners had such
a background in the past, and because they were experts and they left their clients at the door, they
were able to make significant contributions to the development of securities regulation. These
commissioners include: Ray Garrett, Frank Wheat, Richard Smith, and Al Sommer. See Ray
Garrett Jr., 59, Dies, Former SEC Chairman, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1980, at C4; Wolfgang Saxon,
Frank Wheat, 79, of S.E.C. And California Desert Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 29, 2000, at A11; N.Y
Attorney Chosen To Be Member of SEC, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1967, at A5; Claudia Levy, A.A.
Sommer Jr., 77, Dies; Lawyer Spurred SEC Reforms in ‘70s, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2002, at B7.
Recent Republican commissioners, including Kathleen Casey, and the nominee Hester Peirce, have
worked for Senator Richard Shelby. See SEC Biography: Commissioner Kathleen L. Casey, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/casey.htm (last updated Mar. 17, 2008); see also Schmidt
& Michaels, supra note 13. When William Proxmire was head of the Senate Banking Committee,
he preferred the appointment of persons with prior experience on the SEC Staff. See Jack Egan,
Senate Banking Committee Approves Garrett for SEC, WASH. POST, Jul. 27, 1973, at D10. In my
opinion, while a background in government is useful, an agency like the SEC needs some
commissioners who have had real world experience in the securities industry or the private practice
of securities law.
15. See Mark Schoeff, Jr., How partisan politics have poisoned the SEC, INVESTMENT NEWS
(May 10, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150510/REG/150509926/
how-partisan- politics-have-poisoned-the-sec.
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decisions on important issues. Moreover, the selection of commissioners in this
manner results in strong dissents designed to enable affected constituencies to
appeal rulemaking to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit and prevail by upending new regulations.16 As discussed by
the authors, this kind of partisanship has been a historical hallmark of the
National Labor Relations Board, where labor and management commissioners
are often at odds. It was not traditionally the case at the SEC where the agency’s
mission is to police the securities markets and protect investors, and where
influence by outside political forces has been rare.17 In my opinion, this kind of
partisanship has undermined the SEC’s mission and credibility and made it very
difficult for the SEC to complete rulemaking mandated by statute.18 When the
agency operated in a collegial manner, I believe it was much more effective and
respected.
In Chapter Four the authors discuss the appointments process, including
recess appointments and paired appointments.19 The creation of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as an idiosyncratic agency
(which, according to Congress, is neither a government nor private enterprise
organization), and its attack under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution,

16. See id.; see also, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 363–65, 373 (D.C. Cir.
2014); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 8 (D.D.C. 2013).
17. See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 46–47; see also What We Do, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last updated June 10, 2013); Schoeff, supra note 15.
18. It took five years for the SEC to complete the bulk of mandated rulemaking under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, in part because Republicans in the
Congress and at the SEC objected to many of the statutory provisions. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Dodd-Frank Progress Report: Fourth Quarter 2015, DAVIS
POLK, http://prod.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/Q4_2015_Dodd-Frank_Progress_Report.pdf
(last modified Dec. 31, 2015) (reporting that as of December 31, 2015, only 63 of the 94 mandated
rulemakings had been finalized by the SEC); Marcus Baram, Dodd-Frank One Year Later: Slow
Progress On Rules Amid Industry And GOP Onslaught, HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 22, 2011, 9:22
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/21/dodd-frank-one-year-later_n_904391.html;
Josh Boak, Wall Street reform law bogged down, POLITICO (Oct. 30, 2011, 11:04 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2011/10/wall-street-reform-law-bogged-down-067192 (discussing
the slow progress of reform under the Dodd-Frank Act, and the wishes of Republicans to dismantle
the law entirely). In the meantime, Congress passed the JOBS Act, which mandated new
deregulatory rules, and again the SEC was slow to pass rules implementing this law. See Jumpstart
Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.); Ben Goad, Lawmakers fuming as jobs law ‘disappears into the
bureaucracy’, THE HILL (June 9, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://thehill.com/regulation/legislation/304299lawmakers-fume-as-jobs-law-disappears-into-the-bureaucracy; Ross Kenneth Urken, Amidst
Employment Anxiety, Are the JOBS Act Haters Justified?, MAINSTREET (May 1, 2013, 6:55 AM),
https://www.mainstreet.com/article/amidst-employment-anxiety-are-jobs-act-haters-justified-0.
19. BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 119–30.
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which it barely survived, is discussed from a constitutional law perspective.20
However, the politics behind the creation of the PCAOB and the congressional
effort to protect oversight of the accounting profession from industry capture
after the 2008 economic meltdown, is not discussed. While I can appreciate the
authors’ efforts to be high-minded and theoretical in their approach, I do not
believe the controversy and litigation surrounding some of the independent
agencies, like the PCAOB, can be divorced from raw political decision making.
Chapter Five discusses the restriction on the President’s power to remove
agency members from office only for “cause” as a key to agency independence.21
While such tenure has long been considered a key feature of agency
independence by academics, I believe that two other earmarks of independence
discussed in Chapter Six—agency control of its own litigation and independent
funding—are more important as a practical matter.22 If the SEC did not have
the ability to sue anyone the agency believes has violated the securities laws—
including high level political appointees and members of Congress—it would
not be as independent as the SEC is today.23 For example, the effort by the
Nixon Administration to quash the SEC’s case against Robert Vesco was one of
the Watergate scandals, which led to the resignation of an SEC Chair.24 When
I was an SEC Commissioner, this event resulted in a preoccupation with
affirming agency independence from the President, but not the Congress.25
In my opinion, independent funding is a key to such agency independence as
enjoyed by the Federal Reserve Board. Although the SEC takes more money
into the U.S. Treasury than its budget, from registration fees and fines, the SEC
budget is subject to annual appropriations by the Congress.26 Serious efforts to
insulate the SEC from partisan and Wall Street interference by giving the agency
independent funding authority floundered in Dodd-Frank.27 Currently, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s budget is being pared down because

20. Id. at 109–18. See generally Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law:
The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1023–24 (2005).
21. BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 133–61.
22. Id. at 167–75.
23. When I was a commissioner of the SEC, the SEC and the Comptroller of the Currency
brought an action against Bert Lance, President Carter’s Director of OMB. See SEC v. Nat’l Bank
of Ga., 1978 WL 1081, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 1978). Currently the SEC is investigating whether
members of Congress or staffers violated the STOCK Act by trading on inside information. See
SEC v. Comm. on Ways & Means of the U.S. House of Reps., No. 14 Misc. 193 (PGG), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 154302, at *29–33 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2015) (subpoena enforcement case).
24. ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 66–67 (1982).
25. See id.; see also BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 16.
26. See Roberta S. Karmel, The SEC’s Budget and Organization, 244 N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2010,
at 3, 3–4.
27. See id. at 3–4.
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of a dispute between the Chair and the head of the agency’s oversight committee
in Congress.28
The authors of INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES view
Congressional efforts to control agencies as part of the tension between
autonomy and accountability, the topic of Chapter Seven, but they do not delve
into the question of to whom agencies should be accountable.29 Voters do not
elect the members of the agencies, but each agency has a statutory mission, and
most of them have regulatory responsibilities.30 Accountability to Congress
unfortunately often means accountability to regulated industries and others who
fund congressional election campaigns, instead of accountability to the
constituencies that the agencies were created to serve.31 Court review of agency
action is, in my opinion, a more measured and more important accountability
mechanism. Although the authors discuss a great many cases in their book, they
do not treat judicial review as an influence on how agencies function and the
extent of their independence.
Chapter Six also discusses how agency focus on independence led to
Presidential efforts to centralize authority over agency rulemaking through
reviews by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).32 OIRA’s
creation and continued viability is related to some extent to the law and
economics reform deregulatory idea of a cost/benefit analysis for all new agency
rules.33 Congress, however, does not make any such calculation in its statutory
mandates for the creation of new regulations, a problem that can lead to some
interesting judicial challenges.34
Chapter Eight reviews the outsourcing of governmental functions to the
private sector, including government constraints and constitutional obligations
on certain private sector organizations.35 Among the topics in this chapter is
supervised self-regulation in the securities industry.36 This chapter is not strictly
speaking about independent agencies at all, but as government outsources more
28. See Daniel Siegal, CFTC Chair Slams Congress For Denying Budget Bump, LAW 360
(Dec. 21, 2015, 8:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/740471/cftc-chair-slams-congress-fordenying-budget-bump.
29. See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 195–247; see also Ralph S. Tyler & Karen Stakem
Homig, Administrative Law: Rules to Results, 44 MD. B.J., May/June 2011, at 44, 46–47 (noting
that administrative agencies are accountable to the judiciary and the legislature).
30. See Tyler & Homig, supra note 29, at 45; see also, e.g., BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1,
at 197 (discussing that the President appoints the members of agencies with Senate confirmation
through the example of the Assassination Records Review Board).
31. See, e.g., Catherine E. Bill, FCC v. Fox: Has the Supreme Court Sanctioned Political
Influence in Agency Decision-Making?, 61 MERCER L. REV. 643, 658–60 (2010).
32. BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 176–77.
33. Id.
34. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 363–65 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
35. BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 249–87.
36. Id. at 282–86.
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and more of its regulatory and other functions to the private sector, it is
interesting and informative.37
These private sector bodies exercising
governmental functions can be viewed as independent actors and they raise
serious issues as to their accountability.38
Chapter Nine reviews how multi-member agencies function and how the
responsibilities of the agency Chair vis-à-vis its other commissioners affect
internal agency operations.39 The chapter has interesting examples of different
traditions and compromises that different agencies utilize.40 The authors also
consider the inhibiting effect of the Sunshine Act on agency decision-making.41
The authors discuss independent agencies in Europe in Chapter Ten.42 This
chapter is necessarily cursory. It does not analyze how independence in a
parliamentary system is different from independence in the U.S. system, or the
extent to which the European Union system is fundamentally different from
either since it is an organization of nation states. The authors suggest that there
is an opportunity for more research on independent agencies abroad.43 I would
suggest that an analysis of the securities commissions might be particularly of
interest. Theoretically, these specific agencies are supposed to be independent.44
While these agencies are often housed within the Finance Ministry, they are
sometimes free standing.45 Also touched on, but not fully developed in Chapter
Ten, is the influence of international bodies, like the Bank for International
Settlements and the Basle Committee, on national financial regulation.46
In conclusion, in Chapter Eleven the authors speculate on the future of the
independent agency.47 The authors refer to efforts by the executive branch to
centralize power, as discussed in Chapter Six, over federal agencies and

37. Id.
38. See id. at 272–77.
39. Id. at 289–351.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 316–24.
42. Id. at 353–79.
43. E.g., id. at 378–79 (discussing how the “emergence of an interdependent world” will
change our understanding of European agencies, thereby requiring additional research).
44. Id. at 354. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”)
recommends that securities regulators “should be operationally independent from external political
or commercial interference in the exercise of its functions and powers and accountable in the use
of its powers and resources.” INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 10 (2003), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.
pdf.
45. See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 353–54; see, e.g., Directorates-General, FEDERAL
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Web/EN/About/DirectoratesGeneral/directorates-general.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2016) (demonstrating that the Ministry of
Finance in Germany houses the department that deals with securities regulation).
46. See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 1, at 375–76.
47. Id. at 381–96.
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congressional push back.48 The authors wonder whether the Tea Party’s effort
to destroy, or at least seriously curtail federal government regulation, will
change the nature of the independent agencies.49 I think the answer is: no. Some
agencies have been abolished by reformers, and the book does tell the story of
the Civil Aeronautics Board’s demise. But many of its functions were then
transferred to other agencies.50 All of the independent agencies were established
to fill a need for regulation or service, and they are too entrenched in our system
of government to be abolished.51
It can be anticipated, therefore, that INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED
STATES will continue to be read and referred to as a valuable book about the
creation and operation of independent federal regulatory agencies in the federal
system. Although my own career has involved the study and practice of
administrative law, in and out of the government, I learned a great deal from this
book, and despite the quibbles expressed in this review, I found it well-written,
well-researched, and fairly balanced.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 385–94.
Id. at 392–94.
Id. at 222–23.
Id. at 1–8, 222–23.

